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We assess the security of a quantum key distribution protocol relying on the transmission of
Gaussian-modulated coherent states and homodyne detection. This protocol is shown to be equiv-
alent to a squeezed state protocol based on a CSS code construction, and is thus provably secure
against any eavesdropping strategy. We also briefly show how this protocol can be generalized in
order to improve the net key rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) uses quantum mechanics to provide two parties (Alice and Bob) with a secret
key, which they can later use to encrypt confidential information [1]. Unlike classical key distribution, QKD relies, at
least in principle, on no computational assumption, but only draws its validity from the laws of quantum mechanics.
The resources needed for QKD always comprise a source of non-orthogonal quantum states on Alice’s side, a quantum
channel conveying these states to Bob, a measuring apparatus on Bob’s side, and a (public) authenticated classical
channel between Alice and Bob. QKD protocols generally consist in two (intertwined) parts. One part consists in
probing the quantum channel to determine whether it is possible to securely transmit the key over it. The use of
non-orthogonal quantum states allows to achieve this task. The other part consists in the explicit distillation of the
secret key.
Most interest in QKD has been devoted to protocols involving (an approximation to) a single-photon source on
Alice’s side and a single-photon detector on Bob’s side [1, 2]. However, protocols involving quantum continuous
variables have lately been considered with an increasing interest [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Of special importance are “coherent-
state” protocols [8, 9]. The quantum source at Alice’s side then randomly generates coherent states of a light mode
with a Gaussian distribution, while Bob performs homodyne measurements. These protocols are very important
because they seem to allow for facilitated implementations and much higher secret-key generation rates than the
protocols involving single-photon sources [9].
In this paper, we will constructively prove that secure coherent-state protocols relying on homodyne detection
exist. A first security analysis of coherent-state protocols has been carried in [8, 9], but only individual Gaussian
eavesdropping strategies were considered. We here want to address a more general setting and allow a potential
eavesdropper (Eve) to probe the quantum channel between Alice and Bob in any manner she pleases. We want to
establish the security of coherent-state protocols against arbitrary collective attacks (thereby extending [10]). The
importance of our result lies in that it shows that no non-classical feature of light, such as squeezing, is necessary
in continuous-variable quantum cryptography: coherent states, homodyne detection, and well-chosen communication
procedures are sufficient for Alice and Bob to securely distill a secret key.
II. SQUEEZED-STATE PROTOCOLS
The basic ingredient that we shall use in the remaining is the argument used in [11] to prove that the BB84 protocol
is secure, against any eavesdropping strategy, when the procedures used for error correction and privacy amplification
are derived from a CSS quantum error-correcting code [12, 13]. Let us start with a brief review of this argument.
It is well known that quantum error-correcting codes provide a means to perform entanglement purification with
one-way communication [14]. If two parties, Alice and Bob, share N noisy entangled qubit pairs, their situation is
fully equivalent to a situation where Alice would have prepared N pairs, all in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
state:
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), (1)
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2and would have kept half of each pair for herself while sending all other halves to Bob through some noisy quantum
channel. The effect of this channel on the state can be modeled as if the state either remains unaltered or undergoes
either one of the three following “errors”: bit-flip, φ+ → ψ+, or phase-flip, φ+ → φ− or both, φ+ → ψ−, where
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) and |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). In the latter situation, Alice and Bob could get pure EPR pairs
upon Alice using a quantum error correcting code (QECC) to protect the halves sent to Bob from the noise effected
by the channel. Equivalently, in the former situation, Alice and Bob can get CN pairs in the state (1) (C ≤ 1) upon
Alice and Bob measuring the syndromes (or error patterns) of some QECC, Alice communicating the values of her
syndromes to Bob, and Bob performing error correction so as to align the values of his syndromes on those of Alice.
C is then the rate of the used quantum code. It is trivial to achieve secure QKD from entanglement purification
because if Alice and Bob share a 2-qubit system in the state (1), they certainly can extract a secret bit from it.
A (binary) CSS code is a 2k-dimensional subspace of the Hilbert space of n qubits (k ≤ n). Such a code belongs
to the class of so-called stabilizer codes, i.e. they are defined as the eigenspace of a set of mutually commutating
operators {O1, . . . ,OX}, the stabilizer generators. The essential feature of a CSS code is that all stabilizer generators
are either of the form Xs1 ⊗ . . .⊗Xsn or of the form Zs1 ⊗ . . .⊗Zsn , where X |i〉 = |i⊕ 1〉, Z|i〉 = (−)i|i〉, and where
(s1, . . . , sn) ∈ {0, 1}n. Because of this feature, it is possible to prove that entanglement purification using a CSS code
followed by key extraction is fully equivalent to a quantum cryptographic protocol with BB84 as a physical part and
suitable error correction and privacy amplification as classical post-processing part [11]. These procedures read as
follows. Let the binary vectors K and K′ denote respectively Alice’s and Bob’s raw key bits, and let C2 ⊂ C1 denote
two embedded n-bit classical linear codes, with parity check matrices respectively H1 and H2 [15]. Alice announces
the syndrome H1K = ξ
b. Bob corrects K′ to the nearest vector K′′ such that H1K′′ = ξb (error correction). With
high probability, K′′ = K. The key is then reduced to H2K (privacy amplification).
Entanglement purification using CSS codes is (asymptotically) achievable as long as the bit-flip probability eb and
the phase-flip probability ep satisfy
C ≡ 1− h(eb)− h(ep) > 0, (2)
where h(x) = − log2 xx(1 − x)(1−x) denotes the binary Shannon entropy [11]. Equivalently, the BB84 protocol will
allow Alice and Bob to distill a secret key using the error correction and privacy amplification we have described if
the error rates for two conjugate bases satisfy Eq.(2).
From QKD schemes based on entanglement purification of qubits, it is possible to derive a secure QKD scheme
using squeezed states and homodyne detection, which is in spirit very close to the BB84 protocol [4]. Let us present
this scheme in a slightly modified form. Let xˆ and pˆ denote two conjugate quadratures of a single mode of the
electromagnetic field ([xˆ, pˆ] = i). Alice creates (about) 4N quantum oscillators in a squeezed state. She draws a
4N -bit string b to decide for each of the 4N oscillator whether it will be prepared in an x-squeezed state or in a
p-squeezed state. Also, for each oscillator, she draws a real value x (or p) according to a probability distribution
Ppos(x) (or Pmom(p)), and sends Bob an x- (or p-)squeezed state centered on (x, 0) (or (0, p)). Bob receives the states
and decides at random to measure them either in the x-basis or in the p-basis. By public discussion, Alice and Bob
discard the oscillators for which Alice’s choice of preparation and Bob’s choice of measurement don’t match. Alice
and Bob should now have a list of (about) 2N correlated real values (x1, x
′
1) . . . (x2N , x
′
2N ) from which they wish to
extract bits. To do so, they proceed as follows. For each real value, x, Alice decomposes x as
x = (S(x) + S¯(x))
√
π (3)
where S(x) ∈ Z, and reveals S¯(x) = frac(x/√π) (or S¯(p) = frac(p/√π)) to Bob. Alice’s bit is the parity of S(x)
(resp. S(p)). Bob subtracts S¯(x)
√
π from his corresponding real value, x′, and adjusts his result x′ − S¯(x)√π to the
nearest integer multiple of
√
π. The key bit will be 0 if this integer is even, and 1 otherwise. At this point, Alice and
Bob agree on a subset of size (about) N of their key elements that they use for verification. A bit error (resp. a phase
error) occurs when Alice sends an x-squeezed state (resp. a p-squeezed state), and Alice’s bit and Bob’s bit mismatch.
If the estimates of the error rates eb and ep satisfy Eq.(2), Alice and Bob further proceed with error correction and
privacy amplification as described above, and distill a secret key.
Owing to the manner the real axis is binned to associate bits to real numbers, the bit error rate eb is bounded
by the probability that, when Alice sends an x-squeezed state centered on the value x0, |sq(x0)〉, and Bob performs
an xˆ homodyne measurement, Bob gets an outcome whose value differs from x0 by a value greater than
√
π/2. The
phase error rate, ep, can be bounded similarly. Therefore, even in the absence of eavesdropping, eb and ep will
be nonzero, due to finite squeezing. Quantifying squeezing with 10 log10
1
σ˜2 , where the states sent by Alice read
|sq(x0)〉 ∼
∫
dx e−(x−x0)
2/2σ˜2 |x〉 and |sq(p0)〉 ∼
∫
dp e−(p−p0)
2/2σ˜2 |p〉, it was proven in [4] that a minimum of 2.51 dB
of squeezing is necessary for the protocol to work.
3III. CONVERSION TO COHERENT-STATE PROTOCOLS
A. Asymmetric squeezed-state protocols
A first step in the conversion to a coherent-state protocol is to observe that three modifications can be brought to the
above squeezed-state protocol without weakening its security. First, as shown in [4], the above protocol is equivalent
to a protocol where Alice reveals S¯(x) = frac(x/α
√
π) when using the x- quadrature, and S¯(p) = frac(pα/
√
π) when
using the p quadrature, where α is some positive real parameter. Such an asymmetric protocol allows Alice to squeeze
unequally x and p quadratures. The squeezing should only be such that Eq.(2) is obeyed. In particular, Alice can use
coherent states when encoding in the x quadrature, if when encoding in the p quadrature, she uses a state exhibiting
a squeezing of at least 3.37 dB. Our second observation concerns the method used by Alice for encoding. When she
chooses to encode in the x-quadrature, she draws the value of x from Ppos and prepares a coherent state centered
on (x, 0). Similarly, when encoding with the conjugate quadrature, she prepares p-squeezed states centered on (0, p).
The decision to prepare states centered on (x, 0) or (0, p) relies on an arbitrary convention between Alice and Bob for
the axis for x quadrature and the axis for p quadrature. Instead of sending a state centered on (x, 0) (resp. (0, p)),
Alice could as well send a state centered on (x, p), when the key information is encoded in x (resp. in p), and where
the value p (resp. x), drawn from some probability distribution P ′pos(p) (resp. P
′
mom(x)), may in principle be publicly
disclosed to allow Bob to re-translate the state on the x (or p) axis. Finally, we remark that the protocol is no less
secure if Alice and Bob decide that the key is only encoded in the coherent states and never in the squeezed states.
They can decide that about half of the time, Alice will send coherent states to transmit the key and to estimate eb,
while about half of the time, Alice will send squeezed states to estimate ep. This fact holds for BB84 as well: one can
decide that the key is only encoded in Z eigenstates, and that X eigenstates are only sent to determine the phase
error rate. As long as eb and ep satisfy Eq.(2), the protocol will work safely.
In summary, the following is a secure protocol.
#1 Alice prepares the state S = Scoh ⊗ Ssq, where
Scoh = Skey ⊗ Sbck. (4)
Skey = γ(1) ⊗ . . . γ(N) is a tensor product of N coherent states, each drawn from a probability distribution
Ppos(x)P
′
pos(p). Also, S
b
ck = γc(1)⊗ . . .⊗γc(µ) is a tensor product of coherent states, drawn from the same probability
distribution Ppos(x)P
′
pos(p), and S
sq = σ(1) ⊗ . . . ⊗ σ(ν) is a tensor product of p-squeezed states drawn from some
probability distribution P ′mom(x)Pmom(p). The probability distributions Ppos(x)P
′
pos(p) and P
′
mom(x)Pmom(p) are such
that ∫
dx dp Ppos(x)P
′
pos(p) γ(x, p) =
∫
dx dp P ′mom(x)Pmom(p) σ(x, p), (5)
where γ(x, p) (resp. σ(x, p)) denotes a coherent (resp. p-squeezed) state centered on (x, p).
#2 Alice picks a random permutation π ∈ Sym(g) (g = N + µ + ν denotes the total number of oscillators sent by
Alice) and sends the state πSπ∗ to Bob.
#2′ Let the cp-map T : B(H⊗g) → B(H⊗g) denote the quantum channel between Alice and Bob. T represents
the (possibly collective) eavesdropping strategy used by Eve, H is the Hilbert space of an oscillator and B(H⊗g) the
space of bounded operators on H⊗g.
#3 After Bob acknowledges receipt, Alice reveals π and Bob undoes the permutation: T (πSπ∗) → T pi(S) ≡
π∗T (πSπ∗)π. Also, ∀j = 1 . . . µ, Alice discloses the values of xj = tr(xˆ γc(j)), and ∀j = 1 . . . ν, Alice discloses the
values of pj = tr(pˆ σ(j)).
#4 Bob measures the following effects:
X(N+j)(xj) ≡ 1⊗N+j−1 ⊗X(xj)⊗ 1⊗g−(N+j); j = 1 . . . µ; (6)
P (N+µ+j)(pj) ≡ 1⊗N+µ+j−1 ⊗ P (pj)⊗ 1⊗g−(N+µ+j); j = 1 . . . ν, (7)
where X(xj) =
∫ +∞√
pi/2α+xj
dx |x〉〈x| + ∫ −√pi/2α+xj−∞ dx |x〉〈x| and P (pj) =
∫ +∞√
piα/2+pj
dp |p〉〈p|+ ∫ −√piα/2+pj−∞ dp |p〉〈p|.
N.B. each of these measurement has a yes/no outcome. Also note that Bob can as well measure these effects by
performing a homodyne measurement on the corresponding oscillators, since after the measurements he no more
needs these oscillators.
#5 Let eb(j) denote the outcome of the jth measurement, j = 1 . . . µ [eb(j) = 1 if the effect X
(N+j)(xj)] is measured
and eb(j) = 0 otherwise). Likewise, we define ep(j), j = 1 . . . ν. If the estimates for the bit error rate and phase error
rate, eb =
1
µ
∑
j eb(j) and ep =
1
ν
∑
j ep(j) respectively, satisfy the CSS rate inequality (2), Alice and Bob proceed,
as described above, to distill a secret key from the remaining oscillators Skey.
4B. Estimation of the phase-error rate without squeezing
To convert this last protocol to a secure coherent-state protocol, all we need is to prove that the phase error rate,
ep, can be estimated upon Alice sending only coherent states instead of squeezed states and Bob performing only
homodyne measurements. In the following, g will denote again the total number of oscillators sent by Alice and M
will denote a (”sufficiently large”) integer.
Let Sm and S
′
m, m = 1 . . .M , denote two arrays of oscillators, each in a coherent state. Suppose that for all
squeezed states σ(j), j = 1 . . . ν, involved in the last protocol, Alice and Bob had a means to estimate the quantities
φ(j) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
tr(T pi(Sm ⊗ σ(j) ⊗ S′m)P (|Sm|+1)(pj)). (8)
Then, the quantity Φ = 1ν
∑ν
j=1 φ(j) would certainly be as reliable an estimator for the phase error rate as the
quantity ep Alice and Bob get in the modified squeezed state protocol. Now consider a situation where the first four
steps of the last protocol are replaced by the following:
#1 Alice prepares the state
R = Scoh ⊗ Spck, with Spck =
K⊗
k=1
γ⊗Mk ,
where Scoh is given by Eq.(4) and where {γk} denotes K different coherent states, which will be used instead of the
p-squeezed states to estimate ep.
#2 Alice picks a random permutation π ∈ Sym(g) and sends the state πRπ∗ to Bob through the quantum channel.
#2′ Eve acts collectively: πRπ∗ → T (πRπ∗).
#3 Bob acknowledges receipt of the oscillators, Alice reveals π and Bob undoes the permutation T (πRπ∗) →
T pi(R) = π∗T (πRπ∗)π. Also, ∀j = 1 . . . µ, Alice reveals the values xj = tr(xˆγc(j)), and ∀j = 1 . . . ν, she reveals the
values pj = tr(pˆσ(j)).
#4 ∀j = 1 . . . µ, Bob measures the effects X(N+j)(xj), and ∀k = 1 . . .K,m = 1 . . .M , Bob measures the effects
P (N+µ+(k−1)M+m)(pj).
Note that since Bob performs individual measurements, the action of Eve’s collective channel is the same as if she
were acting with individual channels τpii , i = 1 . . . g (g = N + µ+KM denotes the total number of oscillators sent by
Alice) defined, in Schro¨dinger picture, by
τpii : B(H)→ B(H) : ρ→ Tr′i′T pi(γ(i−1) ⊗ ρ⊗ γ(g−i)), (9)
for i = 1 . . . g, where Tr′i′ denotes the partial trace over all subsystems but the ith, and γ
(i−1) (resp. γ(g−i)) represents
an array of (i− 1) (resp. (g − i)) consecutive coherent states from the g coherent states Skey ⊗ Sbck ⊗ Spck.
Thus, in step #4, everything happens as if Bob were measuring P (pj) on τ
pi
i (γk), i(k,m) = N +µ+(k− 1)M +m.
Let f(i(k,m), j, k) denote the outcomes he obtains and let F (j, k) denote the mean value of these M outcomes. Due
to the random permutation π, if M is sufficiently large, we can be statistically confident that F (j, k) doesn’t depend
on the individual cp-map indices, i, chosen for the test, i.e. we can be statistically confident that for all M -uple of
indices 1 ≤ i1 . . . iM ≤ N + µ+KM , would have Bob measured P (pj) on τpii1(γk) . . . τpiiM (γk), the obtained outcomes
f(i1, j, k) . . . f(iM , j, k) would have been such that
1
M
∑M
m=1 f(im, j, k) ≈ F (j, k).
In particular, we can be statistically confident that
1
M
M∑
m=1
f(i(1,m), j, k) ≈ F (j, k),
and a fortiori that
1
M
M∑
m=1
tr[P (pj)τ
pi
N+µ+m(γk)] ≈ F (j, k).
That is,
1
M
M∑
m=1
tr[P (N+µ+m)(pj)T
pi(Scoh ⊗ γ⊗m−11 ⊗ γk ⊗ γM−m1 ⊗
⊗
k′>1
γ⊗Mk′ )] ≈ F (j, k). (10)
5Defining Sm ≡ Scoh ⊗ γ⊗m−11 , S′m ≡ γ⊗M−m1 ⊗
⊗
k′>1 γ
⊗M
k′ , the latter equation reads
1
M
M∑
m=1
tr(P (N+µ+m)(pj)T
pi(Sm ⊗ γk ⊗ S′m)) ≈ F (j, k). (11)
Now let us introduce the operator
Ej =
1
M
∑
m
Tr
Hm
Tr
H′m
(T pi∗ (P
(N+µ+m)(pj))(Sm ⊗ 1⊗ S′m)),
where T pi∗ , the dual of T
pi defines evolution in Heisenberg picture [16] (it is related to T pi through the identity
tr(T pi(ρ)A) = tr(ρT pi∗ (A))), and where Hm (resp. H
′
m) denotes the Hilbert space supporting the state Sm (resp.
S′m). With the help of Ej , Eq.(11) can be re-written as trEjγk = F (j, k) and similarly Eq.(8) as φ(j) = trEjσ(j). It
now only remains to prove that trEjσ(j) can be inferred from the quantities F (j, k) when the coherent states γk are
correctly chosen.
Let σ(j) = |ψj〉〈ψj | and let ∑n ψjn|n〉 denote the expansion of |ψj〉 in Fock basis. Since ∑n |ψjn|2 = 1, we have
∀ǫ > 0, ∃Nj s.t.
∑∞
n=Nj+1
|ψjn|2 < ǫ. Let N = maxjNj and let us denote |ψjN〉 =
∑
N
n=0 ψ
j
n|n〉 and |ψj,cN 〉 = |ψj〉−|ψjN〉.
We have
|〈ψj |Ej |ψj〉 − 〈ψjN|Ej |ψjN〉| < ǫ+ 2
√
ǫ.
Indeed, 0 ≤ Ej ≤ 1 and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality imply that 〈ψj,cN |Ej |ψj,cN 〉 ≤ ||ψj,cN ||2 < ǫ and that |〈ψjN|Ej |ψj,cN 〉| ≤√
ǫ. Thus the knowledge of 〈ψj
N
|Ej |ψjN〉 brings (in arbitrarily good approximation) the knowledge of 〈ψj |Ej |ψj〉. Also,
the quantities 〈ψj
N
|Ej |ψjN〉 can be inferred from the (N + 1)2 quantities 〈l|Ej |n〉, 0 ≤ l, n ≤ N. It thus only remain
to show how to estimate these quantities. Let |αk〉 denote (N + 1)2 = K coherent states and let
∑∞
n=0 c
n
k |n〉 denote
their expansions in Fock basis. The states |αk〉 are chosen such that
∑∞
n=N+1 |cnk |2 < ǫ, ∀k = 1 . . .K. Thus setting
γk = |αk〉〈αk|, we have
F (j, k) + ηk =
N∑
l,n=0
cl∗k c
n
k 〈l|Ej |n〉, (12)
where |ηk| < ǫ + 2
√
ǫ. It is always possible to choose the values αk such that the matrix Γ = [Γ
(l,n)
k ] ≡
cl∗k c
n
k is invertible. Indeed, detΓ is of the form e
− 1
2
∑K
k=1
|αk|2Q(α1, . . . , αK ;α∗1, . . . , α
∗
K), where Q is of the form∑N
λ,µ=0Q
1
λ,µ(α2, . . . , αK ;α
∗
2, . . . , α
∗
K)α
λ
1α
∗µ
1 . Unless all coefficients Q
1
λ,µ are identically zero, detΓ only vanishes for a
finite number of values of α1 when all the values α2, . . . , αK are fixed. Similarly, each polynomial Q
1
λ,µ is of the form∑
ν,ω Q
2
ν,ω(α3, . . . , αK ;α
∗
3, . . . , α
∗
K)α
ν
2α
∗ω
2 , so that (again) unless all the coefficients Q
2
ν,ω are identically zero, Q
1
λ,µ
only vanishes for a finite number of values of α2 when all the values α3, . . . , αK are fixed. And so on, continuing the
reasoning, we see that we can always meet the condition detΓ 6= 0 upon fixing αK to some value such that not all
QK−1ν,ω (αK ;α
∗
K) are zero, fixing αK−1 to some value such that not all Q
K−2
ν,ω (αK−1, αK ;α
∗
K−1, α
∗
K) are zero, . . ., and
fixing α1 such that Q(α1, . . . , αK ;α
∗
1, . . . , α
∗
K) 6= 0. We see that inverting the relation Eq.(12) will provide estimates
for the quantities 〈l|Ej |n〉 (from which we infer the quantities trEjσ(j)), and hence the phase error rate Φ. It is
however important to note that these estimates will only be accurate if ||Γ−1η|| ≪ ||Γ−1F(j)||, where η = (η0, . . . , ηK)
and F(j) = (F (j, 0), . . . , F (j,K)). Therefore, Alice and Bob should add an additional step in the protocol where they
check that this latter condition is indeed satisfied.
IV. FURTHER EXTENSIONS
Let us now sketch how this protocol can extended by relaxing the translational symmetry of the qubit encoding
scheme so as to improve its efficiency and get closer to the effective key extraction procedure introduced in [17] and
implemented in [9]. The technical details will be described in a forthcoming paper [18]. In the same way we can split
a real number into an integer and a fractional part as in Eq.(3), we can encode m qubits in an oscillator with the
following linear transformation (up to normalization)
|x〉 → |S¯(x)〉s¯ ⊗ |S1(x)〉s1 ⊗ . . .⊗ |Sm(x)〉sm , (13)
6s1e1 s2e2
Losses eb1 e
p
1
R1 e
b
2 e
p
2
R2
0.0 dB 3.11% 5.33% 0.752 0.0000401 0.710% 0.938
0.4 dB 3.77% 13.7% 0.193 0.0000782 28.6% 0.135
0.7 dB 4.32% 20.0% 0.0204 0.000125 37.5% 0.0434
1.0 dB - 0.000194 42.3% 0.0147
1.4 dB - 0.000335 45.6% 0.00114
TABLE I: Bit and phase error rates and corresponding net key rates for a two-slice encoding as a function of the channel
attenuation.
which decomposes the oscillator into m qubit subsystems si, i = 1 . . .m, and some continuous subsystem s¯. The
functions Si(x), i = 1 . . .m, called slices, have range {0, 1}. They can be general, and in particular the bit values 0
and 1 do not need be placed periodically on the x axis as in [4]. Instead, one can imagine the x axis cut into 2m
intervals, each assigned to m binary values S1...m(x) (see [17] for more details). Then, S¯(x) (with range [0; 1]) is a
continuous function that carries the remaining continuous information about x not contained in S1...m(x). Note the
similarity with Eq.(3), where the bit value is in the parity of S(x) and the remaining continuous information in S¯(x).
Similarly, Bob can also decompose his oscillator into m qubits (ei, i = 1 . . .m) and one continuous subsystem (e¯).
These decompositions are chosen so as to get high entanglement purification rates Ri = 1−h(ebi)−h(epi ) for the pairs
siei, i = 1 . . .m. The rate Ri of each slice is calculated by tracing out the other parts of the system, that is, as if
the other slices are controlled by Eve. Consequently, the total number of secret bits produced per oscillator can be
safely obtained by summing over the slices, R =
∑m
i=1 Ri. Following an argument similar to the one above, the bit
and phase error rates, ebi and e
p
i , can be estimated from homodyne detection with arbitrary precision.
To further improve the efficiency, the decomposition into the subsystems e1...m may depend both on S¯(x) (e.g., like
in the above protocol, where Bob uses S¯(x) to re-adjust his measured value) and on the bit value of the previous slices
Sj<i(x). This allows Bob to estimate Alice’s bits Si(x) with the information already acquired from the correction of
the bits Sj<i(x), thereby improving the correlations [18].
For illustration, we have applied this “sliced” encoding to the special case of the noiseless attenuation channel,
which is of practical importance. This corresponds to the simplest attack where Eve puts a beam-splitter in between
two sections of a lossless line, sending vacuum at the second input port. Similarly to the implementation of [9], the
modulation variance of Alice was chosen equal to 31× the vacuum noise in both quadratures, which gives Alice and
Bob up to 2.5 common bits in the absence of losses. Using this encoding with two slices, we were able to get the
net key rates described in Table I. The slices S1 and S2 are defined by dividing the real axis into four equiprobable
intervals labeled by two bits, with S1 (S2) being the least (most) significant bit. For the case with no losses, it is thus
possible to distill R = 0.752 + 0.938 = 1.69 secret bits per oscillator, thus significantly improving the rate obtainable
with the encoding of [4], namely, up to one bit per oscillator. Due to the higher bit error rate, it was not possible to
distill secret bits in slice 1 with losses beyond 0.7 dB. It was however still possible to distill secret bits in slice 2 up to
1.4 dB losses (about 10 km with fiber optics with losses of 0.15 dB/km). This value for the maximum tolerable loss
does not stem from any fundamental reason, and might be improved by tuning the modulation variance and/or the
functions S1 and S2.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have studied the security of Gaussian-modulated coherent-state protocols against arbitrary attacks.
We have shown how to extend the protocol of [4] to remove the need of squeezing for estimating the phase error
rate. This quantity can also be estimated using coherent states modulated in two conjugate quadratures, homodyne
measurements, and appropriate classical post-processing. The equivalence between the derived coherent-state QKD
protocol and a squeezed state protocol, itself equivalent to a protocol based on EPR purification with CSS codes,
assesses the security against arbitrary attacks, including collective and/or non-Gaussian attacks. This is compatible
with the fact that coherent-state protocols have been shown to be equivalent to protocols involving entangled bipartite
Gaussian states [19]. Also, we extended the encoding scheme of [4] in order to improve the net key rate. By
transmitting more than one bit per oscillator in a manner derived from an effective reconciliation procedure [9, 17],
numerical results have shown that a secret key can be extracted in an attenuation channel with significant loss.
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